Posts Tagged ‘china’

Cell phones and the Internet are spreading in Cuba, apparently empowering dissidents. This follows illicit television that has been popular in Cuba for years:

Since the 1990s, television has been the censors’ Achilles heel. Thousands of Cubans, mostly in Havana, watch Spanish-language telecasts from Miami. U.S. State Department officials estimate that 10,000 to 15,000 parabolic antennas are in use in Cuba.

Will two-way communications empower more than TV broadcasts? Or will traditional power structures bring about changes in Cuba?

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Lots of good statistics about Internet usage in China.

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Another piece on the trade vs. aid debate, but with a heavier focus on African entrepreneurship. [For more information, see infoDev's page on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, including this report on the SME Financing Gap.]

My favorite class this year was about the rise of China and India as international powers. It was taught by a former World Bank economist who has done much of the work on these two countries’ “knowledge economies.” My term paper examined intellectual property in China and India.

Although many objective observers see stronger intellectual property rights as an amenable, even necessary, policy for China and India, there are significant downsides to increasing IPR protection and enforcement. Strengthened IPR is likely to disproportionately advantage the developed world, decrease the ability of China and India to diffuse productivity-enhancing innovations, prove both insufficient and unnecessary for promoting innovation, and even be counterproductive to the countries’ innovation systems.

Here’s the entire paper. (Also available for download here.)
There Is No Harmony In a Patent Thicket: Towards an Effective IPR Regime in China and India

I just went to a very interesting book talk by Stanley Nollen, a professor at Georgetown, and Neil Gregory of the IFC. Their new book, “New Industries from New Places: the Emergence of Hardware and Software Industries in India and China,” examines the reasons for the rise of different ICT sectors in the two Asian giants.

They began by showing graphs of the exponential rise in software revenues in both China and India since the 1990s, but when broken down into exports and imports, it becomes clear that Indian software is predominently written for exportation while Chinese software is for the domestic market. And although India does not have a similarly developed hardware industry, when that sector is analyzed, Chinese hardware is overwhelmingly exported while what hardware India does make is for domestic consumption.

A number of explanations are typically given for the difference, notably India’s English language proficiency, its higher education system that created a large labor pool of software engineers, and the overbearing regulation that was not extended to Indian software firms. The authors of this book believe that while these are necessary explanations, they are not sufficient. Using a variety of data, including firm-level interviews with 300 Chinese and Indian companies, they think they have flushed out the answer.

Their research suggests that Indian management, not labor, and their pool of larger, better educated professionals were largely responsible. The management can be applauded for seeking quality certifications for Indian software firms and utilizing the diaspora ties. Further, they strategically partnered with far more American software companies than the Chinese did – 60% of surveyed Indian firms had Western partners, compared to only 12% in China. (There was a lot of data thrown into the presentation that focused on the software industry, but I didn’t copy most of it down.) A final reason offered by the authors, more tentatively, was a cultural explanation – Indians tend to be more outspoken and tolerant of ambiguity. Because software creation is a creative enterprise, perhaps they have an inherent comparative advantage.

During the Q&A, Professor Mike Nelson offered some helpful insights from his time with the American IT industry:

• In hardware, you can thrive with 2-3 clients whereas in software, you need many more. Therefore, overcoming the “foreignness” of China is more of a factor than in India where multiple Western clients can be easily courted due to the relative institutional familiarity.
• Timezones shouldn’t be discounted – India is apparently much easier to schedule with than China.
• Given India’s relative governance instability, software (with lower fixed costs) is a more flexible industry – Wipro or Infosys can leave localities more easily than OEMs.

Overall a very interesting talk that adds great data to the debate while debunking commonly held beliefs like the importance of Y2K.

This morning, Rebecca MacKinnon spoke at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about the Internet in China. The talk examined the role of the ‘net in shaping public discourse in China:

Cyberspace has clearly become one of the liveliest public forums in China, despite the efforts by the Chinese government to control online access and content. China’s netizens have become more skillful and assertive in utilizing the Internet to voice their opinions and, occasionally, force the Chinese government to become more responsive.  But the Internet has also allowed more nationalist and radical views to contend for influence and sway public opinion.  How is online public opinion changing Chinese society? Will the new freedoms found in the virtual world lead to greater political participation or help fuel resurgent nationalism? How is the Chinese government responding to online activism?

I was able to attend it and greatly enjoyed the event. Rebecca’s slides and my notes from the event are below. I embedded them with Scribd because the formatting was funky.

RMack Speech Notes

Update: Here is the link to the video of Rebecca’s speech.

Also, here’s the paper I wrote last semester about the role of American Internet companies operating in China. Rebecca’s work was instrumental in my research.
Freedom Fighters – The Role of Internet Corporations in Promoting Digital Freedoms by Kevin Donovan [Updated]

This fall, a wide ranging group of academics, activists and businesses announced the Global Network Initiative – a set of principles and governance mechanisms for ICT corporations operating in authoritarian states. As readers of this blog know, this is just the type of thing I’m interested in, and I jumped on the opportunity to write a term paper about the topic.

So, for my Science and Technology in the Global Arena course I wrote a paper about the role of American Internet companies operating in China. A lot has been written on the subject, of course, but I think the paper adds to the field by arguing that these companies could do much more beyond the Global Network Initiative (which is still laudatory). It is embedded below and a PDF is available here. Let me know what you think.

Freedom Fighters: The Role of Internet Corporations in Promoting Digital Freedoms

It seems the media likes nothing better than a good symbol and nothing says “Rise of China” like the Beijing Olympics. Picking up on the theme, David Brooks has an article on collectivism versus individualism where he provokes that China’s rise through collectivism is a threat to the power of the American dream.

Touching on a topic I mentioned a while back, Brooks explains the fundamental differences in worldview held by Asia and the West. While the West values individuals and their success, Asians seem to prioritize collective harmony. For example, show a fish tank to an American and he sees the biggest fish and its actions. An Asian, on the other hand, sees the relationships between the fish. In experiment after experiment, “Americans usually see individuals; Chinese and other Asians see contexts.”

For much of history, individualist societies excelled economically, but Brooks thinks the rise of China may point to a change in that narrative.

“But what happens if collectivist societies snap out of their economic stagnation? What happens if collectivist societies, especially those in Asia, rise economically and come to rival the West? A new sort of global conversation develops.

The opening ceremony in Beijing was a statement in that conversation. It was part of China’s assertion that development doesn’t come only through Western, liberal means, but also through Eastern and collective ones.”

However, I think Brooks is missing a key point. I’m not an expert on either economics or China, but my understanding of the rise of China is that it hinged upon economic liberalization led by Deng Xiaoping. By opening up to international trade and moving towards a market system, China paved the way to the double-digit growth which has characterized its recent years.

What Brooks alleges, then, is that China has embraced capitalism while maintaining a collectivist spirit. In Ted Koppel’s recent miniseries entitled “The People’s Republic of Capitalism,” he interviewed a Western-educated Chinese youth who thought government censorship and repression was acceptable because it was bringing China out of poverty and improving millions of lives. Brooks sees this sentiment, which I believe is widespread, as a collectivist capitalism.

I disagree. I think it is driven by self-interest; it is individualistic. Those suppressed are not supporting the suppression. They don’t think collective harmony for growth is good, like Brooks supposes. The Koppel interview shows citizens who are being personally benefited by markets – the selfishly driven interaction of individuals. The rise of China – an economic phenomenon of GDP growth – comes with increased individualism. My intuition is that while it may masquerade as collectivism (“all of China is benefiting from this system, so suppression of dissent is okay”), it is really individuals seeing themselves benefit and liking it. Brooks thesis, as I understand it, would be supported by an active Falun Gong member supporting his suppression because his family is richer than last year. And, although I haven’t looked hard, I don’t think that is happening.

[Image credit]

It’s official: China is now the largest Internet market with 253 million users. The number is only 19% of the Chinese population, well behind the 70% of Americans who are Internet users. Recent years have seen a noted increase in Internet penetration, especially among younger citizens. The rapid economic development of China has led to a significant segment of the population which has both the time and the money to be online.

There are many obstacles to the realization of international connectivity; among them:

• the difficulties of deploying digital infrastructure,
• the high cost of connections,
• language barriers, and
• cultural differences.

The first two barriers are certainly complex tasks which rely on technical, political and economic variables, but my gut feeling is that they are not as important as the other, less tangible hurdles. Undoubtedly someone with a more sophisticated understanding of network deployment could tell me why the Internet’s global penetration is not a guarantee, but on this topic I am optimistic. There is a hearty demand for the information-bearing networks and, in tow, a swarm of would-be ISPs, web services and advertisers seeking to support the demand. With development, we will see the digital divide crumble.

The cultural divide is what worries me.

The instantaneous, global spread of ideas is unprecedented in human history. Sure, the Silk Road is a fascinating example of the globalization of products and diseases; even a few ideas made the journey. Sure, by some measures the world was just as globalized prior to WWI. But the scale and extent of the current global information society dwarfs historical comparisons. For the first time in history, ordinary citizens have the capabilities to connect across the globe to people of wildly different backgrounds, histories and interests. It was supposed to be a sovereign realm unto itself where “governments of the industrial world… have no sovereignty.” Nationalism was supposed to disappear, to dwell in history with the horrific wars and conflicts it supported.

The reality, is quite different. The Economist notes that, “the very people whom the Internet might have liberated from the shackles of state-sponsored ideologies—are using the wonders of electronics to stoke hatred between countries, races or religions.” How can these painful distortions of humanity be limited in the digital realm? The answer, of course, isn’t clear, but my intuition is that it will not depend on hardware or software. A future free from conflict – digital and physical – will be paved by breaking down the cultural differences and coming to understand the reasons for differences of opinion.

One area technology may help is in breaking down the language barriers which make meaningful conversation difficult. Tools like Google Translate are a good start, but they are far from perfect and understanding the nuance behind political differences requires much more than what is available now. Instead, we must rely on human translation which introduces a level of bias (no matter how innocent the translator) and, oftentimes, shifts discussion to another location, as is the case with Global Voices.

Take the example that the New Yorker did in a recent piece on China’s rising cybernationalists. By all accounts, Tang Jie is on his way to becoming an accomplished academic who has a firm understanding of the West and the current international diplomatic scene. Tang is also the creator of an incredibly popular video which capitalized upon and created a nationalistic uproar earlier this year following the Tibetan protests in March and Olympic torch debacle in Paris. The video, embedded below, is full of crescendos of dramatic music, potent imagery and conspiratorial suggestions of a new Cold War run by a “cabal” against China.

[youtube=http://youtube.com/watch?v=MSTYhYkASsA]

But below this sensational 6 minutes, as Evan Osnos’s excellent article explains, is a sophisticated, thoughtful thinker who approaches political disputes openly.

When people began rioting in Lhasa in March, Tang followed the news closely. As usual, he was receiving his information from American and European news sites, in addition to China’s official media. Like others his age, he has no hesitation about tunnelling under the government firewall, a vast infrastructure of digital filters and human censors which blocks politically objectionable content from reaching computers in China. He’s baffled that foreigners might imagine that people of his generation are somehow unwise to the distortions of censorship. “Because we are in such a system, we are always asking ourselves whether we are brainwashed,” he said. “We are always eager to get other information from different channels.” Then he added, “But when you are in a so-called free system you never think about whether you are brainwashed.”

However, although Tang and his friends point out valuable discrepancies in how America runs foreign or trade policy, the truth of the matter doesn’t get translated into his video. What has happened is a cultural homoginzation of tools, but underneath remains a cultural deviation of values. Both Students for a Free Tibet and Tang Jie communicate with supporters via online videos, but the underlying differences are masked by the same sensationalism that poisons CNN and Tang’s video.

A screenshot from Tang's video

In a rapid-fire media environment, the sort of enlightened exposure between thoughtful objectors needs to be cultivated – on both sides of the Pacific. Grace Wang is one of those enlightened thinkers, but the crazed online mob got in the way:

At Duke University, Grace Wang, a Chinese freshman, tried to mediate between pro-Tibet and pro-China protesters on campus. But online she was branded a “race traitor.” People ferreted out her mother’s address, in the seaside city of Qingdao, and vandalized their home. Her mother, an accountant, remains in hiding. Of her mother, Grace Wang said, “I really don’t know where she is, and I think it’s better for me not to know.”

Although I’m beginning to sound like a Luddite, I am anything but. For a long time I was outspoken in my belief that China was acting horribly in Tibet. The Internet, and listening openly to others, has given me a deeper, more levelled understanding. I think attentively designed conversations will arise in the amazing information landscape of the Internet. We just need to consciously recognize the technical and cultural inputs to do so. And we need to recognize that they may not be universally embraced. For example, although the American tradition is steeped in recognizing freedom of expression as a foundational element of political discourse, a majority of polled Chinese approve of government control of information. So, I’m reminded of Rebecca MacKinnon’s headline during the recent Tibetan protests: Is discussion possible? It is a question of acute importance whose answer relies on both the technical and cultural.

In the past, I’ve written about censorship on the Internet, especially the Chinese example. It is a touchy subject for many – bringing up both ardent nationalism and unabashed support for free expression. Like many topics of debate which tend to have emotional currents, it is difficult at times to address the substantive issues. That’s why this nuanced point of view on Chinese net censorship is so refreshing. Though I may disagree with the author on some of the points, it provides a good view. Some choice quotes:

“Often, people speak of “censorship” without acknowledging that there is a background of this kind of contest going on. Fundamentally, the assumption behind the intuition that “censorship” is bad is that other people ought to see things just the way we see them. And that may be a laudable goal or a bad goal. But it’s not self-evident. To say that someone else is censoring is to say that they are not seeing things the way we want to see them, and whether the views of those others are “authentic” (in the sense of being liberal or democratic) may be relevant or not to the determination, but again it’s not self-evident.”

and

“You view the Chinese search results as “censored,” but actually, every time I do a search on Tiananmen on Google I feel I’m watching the result of a Google bomb. To me, the iconic image of Tiananmen is the one where Chairman Mao stood up and declared the founding of the People’s Republic. That moment is the dividing line between pre-modern China and modern China, and for many Chinese it is an image that is much more potent than the images of the protests.”

These are genuine, reflective opinions on an issue which is not as binary as it is often made out to be.

I have a post up at Techdirt about Chinese efforts to control Internet discussions through crowdsourcing:

“Wikipedia crowdsourced Britannica. Threadless did the same with graphic T-shirts. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk helped crowdsource the search for Steve Fosset. Now, the Chinese Internet censors are using the process to aid in their control of information online.”

Head over and check it out.

Fareed Zakaria, one of the leading public intellectuals, has published a new book entitled “The Post-American World.” In it, Zakaria synthesizes the major trends influencing America and makes a compelling case for what America and the world’s future could and should hold.

Part descriptive, part prescriptive, this book examines the “rise of the rest,” Zakaria’s term for the increased political and economic power of countries previously caught in poverty. The ascendancy of India and China is specifically examined. Zakaria is clear-headed and cogent as he describes the relative rise of the two nations. It is not his belief that America is falling, only that others are rising. In fact, after noting the similarities between the British Empire and America’s 20th century hegemony, it is hard to disagree with his prediction of a leveling of the international field.

In coming to terms with the reality of a world without a unipole, the author succinctly prescribes the role of America as he sees it. Even though the legitimacy of the USA has been severely harmed in recent years through blunder and error, Zakaria thinks that the historical legacy and continuing importance of American power will allow it to reposition itself into a global Bismarkian force. Economic prowess and diplomatic adeptness, Zakaria contends, will allow America to maintain special allegiance with more countries than most.

My only qualms with the book stem from the same qualities which make it an important one: it is brief and approachable. Though this increases the liklihood that Zakaria’s thoughtful work will reach more readers, it limits the attention he can give to countries rising besides India and China. I would have liked to see a discussion of Russia, Brazil, South Africa and other but will have to look elsewhere. Perhaps Parag Khanna’s The Second World will help here.

Overall, this is a book I tore through (and from my brother’s hands). As McCain and Obama shape their domestic and foreign policy, this is a book which should factor in heavily. Although many of the themes – competition, nuclear proliferation, cultural differences – will be familiar to readers, Zakaria molds them into a comprehensive narrative worthy of your time.

[Image: New Yorker]