Archive for the Category Surveillance

 
 

Growing Mobile Surveillance in Africa & Failed Biometric IDs in Britain: Two New Publications

A paper with Aaron Martin has just been published in First Monday. It is the updated version of a working paper published through LSE.

The Rise of African SIM Registration: The Emerging Dynamics of Regulatory Change

The African experience with mobile telephony has been extolled as a defining moment in the continent’s contemporary economic, social, and political development. Yet SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) registration schemes are threatening to throttle the technology’s developmental potential. These mandates, which require the registration of identity information to activate a mobile SIM card, are fast becoming universal in Africa, with little to no public debate about the wider social or political effects. Whereas some authors have explored the motivations behind these drives, as well as their potential economic impacts, this paper focuses its critique on the broader diversity of implications of this regulatory transformation. Viewing SIM registration through a lens that surveillance studies and information & communication technologies for development, it examines elements of resistance across a range of actors, as well as other emerging effects like access barriers, linkages to financialization, and Africa’s budding mobile surveillance society.

Additionally, he and I have a piece in Public Understanding of Science about the way in which a failed project of British biometric identification attempted to conjure ‘the public’ only to find multiple publics emerge. (open access version)

New Surveillance Technologies & Their Publics: A Case of Biometrics

Before a newly-elected government abandoned the project in 2010, for at least eight years the British state actively sought to introduce a mandatory national identification scheme for which the science and technology of biometrics was central. Throughout the effort, government representatives attempted to portray biometrics as a technology that was easily understandable and readily accepted by the public. However, neither task was straightforward. Instead, particular publics emerged that showed biometric technology was rarely well understood and often disagreeable. In contrast to some traditional conceptualizations of the relationship between public understanding and science, it was often those entities that best understood the technology that found it least acceptable, rather than those populations that lacked knowledge. This paper analyzes the discourses that pervaded the case in order to untangle how various publics are formed and exhibit differing, conflicting understandings of a novel technology.

 

Development & Surveillance: The Responsibility of Donors

A few weeks ago, Citizen Lab revealed that they had located spyware from FinFisher in South Africa and Nigeria. Along with previous evidence that it was operating in Ethiopia – as well as numerous other low- to middle-income countries outside of Africa – the Citizen Lab report is just the most recent piece of data pointing to the emergence of considerable surveillant capacity in the developing world. Not all of these systems are as obviously troubling as FinFisher; indeed, many are being explicitly and genuinely promoted as development tools.

From surveillance drones in the DRC to national biometric identification databases like India’s Aadhaar, the ambiguity of technologies for collecting, tracking, and managing personal data is on full display. Even the widely-hailed success of mobile phones are deeply ambiguous with regard to surveillance and privacy (as the growth of SIM registration requirements demonstrate).

For a variety of reasons, though, these issues are not being addressed with the seriousness they demand as donors, aid organizations, and humanitarian groups adopt drones, biometrics, and other information technologies. There may certainly be good reasons in some situations to adopt these technologies, but doing so without appropriate safeguards and regulations – as is frequently the case – is, to say the least, irresponsible.

To raise some of these issues, Carly Nyst and I have a piece in Slate, Privacy for the Other 5 Billion:

Humanitarian organizations, development funders, and governments have a responsibility to critically assess these new forms of surveillance, consult widely, and implement safeguards such as data protection, judicial oversight, and the highest levels of security. In much of the world, these sorts of precautions are sorely lacking: For example, despite the success of information technology in Africa, only 10 countries on the continent have some form of data protection law on the books (and even those rarely have the capacity or will to enforce them)…

Given the enormity of the challenge facing these organizations, it is perhaps easy not to prioritize issues like privacy and security of personal data, but the same arguments were once made against gender considerations and environmental protections in development. Aid programs that involve databases of personal information—especially of those most vulnerable and marginalized—must adopt stringent policies and practices relating to the collection, use, and sharing of that data. Best practices should include privacy impact assessments and consider the scope for “privacy by design” methodologies.

The Rise of African SIM Registration: Mobility, Identity, Surveillance & Resistance

Aaron Martin and I have written a paper on the rise of a new form of surveillance in Africa, namely SIM card registration. We were interested in documenting the trend, pointing to some of its emerging effects, and noting the dynamics of resistance. In the interest of starting a wider conversation on the topic, we are releasing a working paper that we hope to finalize in the coming weeks; in the meantime, feedback is welcome.

The Rise of African SIM Registration: Mobility, Identity, Surveillance & Resistance

Abstract: The African experience with mobile telephony has been extolled as one of the most important moments in the continent’s ongoing economic development. Yet in a region where mobile telephony is the predominant form of communication, SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) registration schemes are threatening to throttle the technology’s developmental potential. These mandates, which require the registration of identity information to activate a mobile SIM card, are fast becoming universal in Africa, with little to no public debate about the wider social or political effects. Whereas some authors have explored the motivations behind these drives, as well as their potential economic impacts, this paper focuses its critique on the varying forms of resistance to SIM registration as well as the emerging effects like access barriers, linkages to financialization, crime, and Africa’s budding surveillance society. Viewing SIM registration through a surveillance lens, it examines elements of resistance across different relevant social groups.

The working paper is number 186 from the LSE Information Systems and Innovation Group, and is available from SSRN here.

Update: This research was covered by IT Web Africa and the BBC World Service.